An Interpretation of the Mind-Body Problem

Epistemological dualism is the view that man consists of two, completely separate and essentially different entities - mind and body - and that all human behaviour must be explained by the causal action between these entities**. This model of man, that there exists a total split in his personality, is obviously the product of an ambivalent fantasy. No wonder, then, that the mind-body problem cannot be solved either by logical or by factual argument, that it has been a puzzle mystifying philosophers for some two thousand years. For fantasies are not overcome by logic, not even by facts - though both logical reasoning and factual knowledge help us in defeating a fantasy by confronting us with reality.

I want to illustrate the situation by discussing, briefly, the official, philosophical attempts at treating the mind-body problem. In particular, I want to look at the notions of substance and of cause which are crucial here. Both these notions are typical of metaphysics; they exemplify the kind of intellectual defence that philosophers are prone to indulge in. The excessive use of dichototomies that characterizes this mode of philosophizing supports my view that we deal here