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The continuing interest in and exploration of the significance of psychoanalysis for the human sciences seems particularly important now for several reasons. First of all, over the last two decades attacks on the validity of the basic premises of psychoanalysis have intensified, as has pressure from managed care organizations for shorter, more behavioral and/or psychopharmacological treatments of psychological symptoms. These external pressures create a real danger that psychoanalysis could be dismissed, both as a theory of human psychology that is too anachronistic and oblivious to advances in other human sciences and as a treatment modality that is too expensive, too long, and ineffective. Thus, it seems vital for psychoanalysis to reclaim and validate its essential core contribution, namely that intrapsychic unconscious dynamics are decisive in shaping human behavior and experience. In defending this “bedrock” of psychoanalytic theory, Schwaber (1992) states, “In its paradigmatic significance, it has changed the way we see the world” (1040).
Secondly, within psychoanalysis there currently seems to be enormous ferment, with multiple schools of thought proliferating, each offering competing formulations of theory and of treatment. The original split between what is now called one-person versus two-person paradigms has continued to spawn more divisions and differentiated groups. This could be seen (to borrow Erikson's [1968] terminology) as an identity crisis within the field that is creating identity diffusion that might result in dysfunction and collapse of the profession. Certainly, some recent trends could be read as signs of decline, e.g., the closing of many long-term, psychodynamically oriented treatment centers, the difficulty of recruiting doctoral-level candidates for psychoanalytic institutes, the scarcity of