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Consider the following statements: first, a “psychological theory deserving any consideration must furnish an explanation of ‘memory’” (Freud, 1895, p. 299); and second, “[h]ysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Breuer & Freud, 1893-95, p. 7). Taken from among Freud's earliest works, these statements point to a new and different experience of time based on the temporalization of the unconscious. Freud outlined the latter, initially, in the Project for a Scientific Psychology, relying on the model of hysteria to articulate the theory of repressed memories: “We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by deferred action [nur nachträglich]” (1895, p. 356). We are, in many respects, still taking the measure of these inaugural statements, estimating the scope of Freud's contribution in the wider context of what we know about human memory. This paper is a contribution to this ongoing work of critical inquiry. It comprises a close reading of some of Freud's key texts on the theory of memory, as well as a consideration of contemporary contributions to the following themes: (a) the concept of “mnemic-trace” (Erinnerungsrest); (b) the relationship between memory and the uncanny; and (c) the role of conviction in our sense of the past.
What is one doing when one remembers? The criterion of action proves decisive in approaching the problem of memory. I argue in this paper that memory is the doing of a certain kind of action. Freud conceptualized the distinction between “memory” and “action,” most notably, in his paper “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through” (1914). In response to repetitive enactment, understood as a disavowal of past experience, Freud assigned analysis the task of filling in “gaps in memory” and,