A Critique of the Libido Theory

The libido theory has been criticized from its inception by many who have known relatively little about psychoanalysis and by others well grounded in its precepts. Its major principles continue to dominate large sections of psychoanalytic thinking, and, by and large, it still constitutes accepted doctrine.

Comprehensive and thorough criticism of the Libido Theory would require at least one good-sized volume. This paper makes no pretense at such comprehensiveness, but discusses points of apparent vulnerability in the theoretical constructs.

The term “libido” was initially used by Freud in 1894 to connote a psychical sexual desire.1 In his paper “On Narcissism—An Introduction,”2 libido becomes the sexual psychic energy and, as stated in 1915, Freud refers to libido as “a force of variable quantity by which the processes and transformation in the spheres of sexual excitement can be measured.”3 In its simplest terms, libido is the force or energy that is the mental counterpart of the sexual somatic excitations. In brief, and in somewhat over-simplified form, the Libido Theory states the following:

The mind is an apparatus for mastering excitation. Sexual excitation is manifested as an excitatory process in erotogenic organs, in which they are transformed in some way, and related in some way to psychic energy, or psychical states of tension. When psychic tension is raised beyond certain levels, a state of Unlust arises. The state of Unlust promotes activity to secure discharge of tension with accompanying states of gratification. The psychic energy can be accumulated and is stored in the reservoir of ego libido. Because of the overfullness of this reservoir, the libido flows out to objects to cathect them, with the resulting relief, or impoverishment, of the ego libido, depending on the amounts of libido cathected. Besides having a quantity, the libido also has a quality depending on the source of its organ origin. If it arises from oral excitations, it is oral libido; if f