Discussion of “Horney's Theory of Neurosis: A Developmental-Structuralist Interpretation”

Van den Daele defines Horney's theory as a metapsychology which fulfills the requirements of a descriptive or configural structuralism. Although this is a praiseworthy effort, in itself it does not add to the psychoanalytic theory of Horney beyond classifying it, which is something that has been attempted in the past. It is in the same fashion that the terms “culturalism” and “holism” were to become so familiar to us. If this were the only purpose of Van den Daele's theory, it could be considered a fruitless exercise devoid of value. The attempt, however, of reintroducing a historicogenetic emphasis in Horney's valuable contribution is a most commendable and timely achievement, and it deserves careful scrutiny.

In this paper I am going to address two issues. The first is the place of structuralism in contemporary thinking, and particularly its relevance to Horney's theory. I will have to be schematic, given the complexity of the issue and the limitations of space.

Historically, science has had guiding paradigms that were often contributed by a privileged area of scientific endeavor which at the particular time had a breakthrough—hence the cyclic relevance of particular domains. Physiology inspired the physiocrats in economy, for example, and thermodynamics was an acknowledged paradigm for Freud. Philosophy used to be the privileged area in which the paradigm would be expressed as a general principle of science. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a number of “systemic” thinkers appeared who wanted to unify and comprehend the largest domains possible in science: Hegel in philosophy, history, and methodology; Darwin in natural history; Marx in sociology, history, and economics; Lewis Morgan in anthropology; and, finally, Freud in psychoanalysis. I call these thinkers systemic because they expanded their horizons in an attempt to find a unitary explanation of natural as well as social facts.