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The subject of cognition has perennially preoccupied philosophers and psychologists. Psychoanalysts have become increasingly interested in it during the past 20 years, but modern neo-Freudian analysts have shown a sudden upsurge of concern only during the last two years. This may represent a “getting-on-the-bandwagon” type of surge that occurs so frequently for subjects of psychoanalysis, which come and go. At the 1979 meeting of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, the views expressed by the majority of speakers gave precisely that impression. They were conceptualizing their ideas about cognition prematurely without having given it sufficiently deep, contemplative, or perceptive study, or sufficient time for its clinical application to have proven itself effective. This is also true of some of the psychologists and psychiatrists who are trying to relate cognition to psychopathology.
From its root word-structure, the term “cognition” would seem to be a noun, implying that it indicates a substantive entity. This use of the term leads to both psychological and philosophical difficulties. It is hardly possible to define cognition by a short, succinct definition. Modern authors and dictionaries give many and varied definitions. Several psychiatric and psychoanalytic dictionaries do not even list that term alone. Instead they list corresponding verbs, like cognise or cognitize, or adjectives, like cognitive acts or processes.
For example, A. Beck defined a “cognitive structure” or “schema” as “a relatively enduring component of the cognitive organization in contrast to a cognitive process, which is transient.” He includes Horney—with her concept of self-image—among the six major clinicians who “have provided