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The use of the concept disorders, in general, and sexual disorders (for the purpose of this discussion), in particular, can impede serious psychoanalytic work. The notion of a sexual disorder presupposes two things. The first is that sex can be meaningfully separated from an individual's central character structure, that it is a disorder somewhat apart from the core workings of the individual. The second is that there are universal and objective criteria for what is sexually in order and out of order. I will attempt to illustrate that one's sexuality is primarily a metaphor for character and that separating it as a symptom for special study works against psychological integration. Speculations will be offered to account for the fascination with and the primary focus on sex in the history of psychoanalysis and, more recently, the behavior therapies. The emphasis throughout is the argument that sex is an expression of character and not the prime motive behind the development of character.
The diagnosis of a particular pattern of living can run the risk of setting up expectancies and presuppositions which may narrow the therapist's field of vision. When the emphasis is on sexual diagnosis (sexual disorders), the primary focus on the sexual symptom or problem may lead the professional away from understanding the central character structure from which the sexual orientation stems. This diversion is evident in a good deal of the psychoanalytic literature when a sexual problem is a major presenting symptom. The study and analysis of the symptom often seem to take on a life of their own. Once diagnosed, the symptom is often not connected with how a person currently lives in the world but is traced back to infantile events according to the structures of a specific metapsychology.
George Klein's paper “Freud's Two Theories of Sexuality” (8) eloquently