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Traditional psychoanalysis is in very considerable ferment and controversy over where to position itself vis-à-vis the gathering momentum of self-psychological theory. The self movement is already well established, probably irrevocable and, from all available evidence, continuing to grow in scope and depth.1
Despite the wish of classical theorists, the psychology of self has not simply remained an alternative viewpoint, an ancillary or auxiliary construct within the mainstream of classical analysis. What started out as “a set of technical innovations with specific patients [has grown into] an entire theoretical system” (Mitchell, 1984, p. 627). The system proposes a clear redefinition of psychoanalytic thinking away from mechanistic theorizing, logical positivism, and associated postures of detachment. In the words of Stephen Mitchell, the Sullivan trained psychoanalyst, the system is
thoroughly at odds with classical Freudian theory in all basic areas—a new meta-psychology based on different epistemological principles, and providing an innovative model of mind and new theories of child development, psychopathology, and analytic technique (Mitchell, 1984, p. 627).
While I have shared a sense of exhilaration at the growth of the movement, a movement undaunted, at least thus far, by the spectre of professional disenfranchisement or quarantine, I am mindful of earlier psychoanalysts who felt just as strongly as Kohut about these basic issues in psychoanalysis, and who, for their efforts, were simply converted into non persons. I, refer, of course, to the work of Karen Horney, most especially her meta psychological critique of classical psychoanalysis, published in 1939 but as fresh as if it were written today, and her major contribution to self theory, Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle toward Self-Realization, published in 1950. And, I must