A Response to “Horney Theory: An Object Relations Theory”

I am practically in wholehearted agreement with the concluding lines of Ingram and Lerner's paper comparing Horney theory with object relations theory:

It would not be correct to regard Horney as a forerunner of object relations, nor to attempt some metatheoretical fusion of her ideas with those of other object relations theorists. Her work stands solidly as it is. Yet as psychoanalysts working in a contemporary environment, we are served through an appreciation of how much her work and that of other object relations thinkers draw together, and at times even touch.

Any psychoanalytic theories that are not narrowly formed and that provide valid insights into the nature of how we function are bound to have significant areas of overlap, for they touch on the same realities of being human. Both have much to offer, and to have knowledge of both kinds of theories provides a much broader armamentarium of treatment options.

Yet, I would respond to their paper because in its very title, as well as in several of its points, it implies a degree of relationship between object relations theory and Horney theory, namely, that Horney theory is an object relations theory that, in my judgment, does not hold. My argument here is one of perspective: that the similarities do not form essential links and an emphasis on them is not theoretically useful. Rather, it is their differences that clarify the nature of each theory and that lead to usefully different ways of understanding and working with people.

Horney certainly acknowledges that psychic development is largely shaped by the individual's early interactions with the parents. So do virtually all psychoanalytic theories. What defines object-relations theory or theories is making this the overwhelmingly central theme of all that follows.