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The predominant scientific model of mental functioning was for many years that of cognitive psychology. In this model the mind is seen as an information processor analogous to a complex, sophisticated computer. Unlike behaviourism, cognitive psychology acknowledges the existence of internal mental states, but rejects introspection or research based on subjective experience: individuals are deemed to be dynamic information processing systems whose mental activity can be described in computational terms (Neisser, 1967).
By the end of the 1990s, however, the limits of cognitive psychology had become obvious and this model had been much criticized. Some of the critiques were based on the fact that the information processed by the brain does not consist of clearly defined symbols as in the case of artificial intelligence (Edelman, 1992), while other authors objected that cognitive psychology saw the individual not as an agent, but purely as an information processor (Varela et al., 1991). Lastly, the fact had been disregarded that the functioning of our minds depends on our bodies, on motor behaviour and on the relations between ourselves and others (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Damasio, 1994; Gallese, 2010).
The growing doubts concerning the explanatory validity of cognitive psychology were paralleled by a substantial expansion of our knowledge of brain function. Findings relating to the neural foundations of human memory, new knowledge about the mechanism of conditioning and the discovery of the possible foundations of empathy and the role of the motor system in cognitive processes offered a more satisfactory description of mental life than the computational sciences. As a number of neuroscientists (e.g. Crick & Koch, 1990; Changeux & Ricoeur, 1998) have pointed out, in this research context the neurosciences have gained sufficient maturity to address the question of the «naturalization» of mental functions - that is, to give these concepts a neurophysiological explanation.