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According to neuroscientists such as Damasio and Solms, consciousness is thought to merely be an extension to the sentient of the homeostasis that governs life in its tendency to preserve and reproduce itself. Yet it is precisely this supposed homeostatic correlation between biological and sentient intelligence that is problematic for psychoanalysis, to the extent that it undermines the persuasion, in neuroscience, that today we are technically capable of artificially reconstructing the apparatuses from which consciousness itself is induced to produce itself. The irreducibility of psychoanalysis to the neuroscientific rationale is described, in this article, as the irreducibility of the unconscious to consciousness, of drives to feelings, of the libidinal economic process to homeostasis, of the specificity of the sexual to the generality of needs andemotions, of symptomaticity to relationality, of archeogenealogical heterogenesis to biopolitical teleology, of the process of subjectivation to the essentialist subject and its algorithmic devices.
KEYWORDS: Consciousness, homeostasis, neuroscience, psychoanalysis, subjectivation.