Psychoanalysis and Theory Formation

Whether or not psychoanalysis is a basic science, the psychology underlying psychiatry (Freud, 1916, p. 21) that Freud believed it to be, remains an oft-debated and still unsettled issue. Rather than review and evaluate individually the numerous criticisms and defenses of psychoanalysis as a science which have appeared in the professional literature, I will attempt to clarify some of the questions involved by applying the tenets of scientific philosophy to Freud's concept of theory formation.

The nature, manner of acquisition, and validation of scientific knowledge was a controversial issue until progress in theoretical mathematics and mathematical physics in recent times resolved problems that had previously existed in philosophy. The search for absolute and absolutely certain knowledge that preoccupied so many metaphysicians and epistemologists in past centuries has been shown to be an unfruitful and perhaps an impossible quest. Scientific theory is valuable insofar as it permits verifiable predictions to be made; more cannot be expected from it.

My thesis is that the division of psychoanalysis into clinical and metapsychological theories, the former being considered empirical and inductive, and the latter speculative and deductive, is neither philosophically correct nor functional. In addition, consideration must be given to revising the assumption that metapsychology is abstracted from clinical theory.

Examination of some of the concepts involved will lead to the following suggestions: (1) There are inductive and deductive theories, but these are not to be equated with inductive and deductive inference. (2) Deductive theory is not solely the product of deductive inference, nor is inductive theory formed exclusively through inductive inference. (3) All so-called empirical or natural science is composed of inductive theories. (4) Inductive theories can be further divided into classificatory and explanatory theories; these are not on a continuum but run si