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It is hardly possible to find a psychoanalytically oriented study of affect that does not begin with a complaint about the insufficiency of contemporary psychoanalytic formulations and theories about how to deal with it. Rapaport (1953) opens his survey with the declaration: “We do not possess a systematic statement of the psychoanalytic theory of the affect” (p. 177); and Sandler and Sandler (1978), a quarter of a century later, in their presentation to the 30th International Psycho-Analytic Congress in Jerusalem, stated: “Our theory of affect is, at best, in a state of healthy and constructive chaos” (p. 285).
Nor is the general psychological literature more helpful; psychologists, too, are likewise unable to offer any accepted and agreed-upon theory of affect. In fact, a survey of the abundant literature in this field will soon reveal that the range of theories suggested by the various authors covers practically all the possible points of view prevalent in contemporary psychology. There are authors who tend to relate affects to the sphere of communication, a view expressed first by Darwin (1872), and revived recently by Basch (1976), who stated that “… affect, so called, is in fact an onto- and phylogenetically early form of communication” (p. 776). Others tend to relate affect to the sphere of sensation and perception; for example, James (1884), Lange (1885), and recently Bowlby (1969) who states: “… affects, feelings, and emotions are phases of an individual's intuitive