On the Scientific Status of Empathy

In a cursory review of the literature on empathy, and especially on the role of empathy in psychoanalysis, one seems to see a division into two camps. One view is that as desirable as empathy may be in the diagnosis and treatment of patients in analysis, it is a relatively rare phenomenon. It is unusual for one person to be truly empathic with another. Furthermore, it is an unreliable procedure fraught with the dangers of error due to deception and countertransference; the achievement of true and reliable empathic connections can be realized only after sustained effort and repeated failures. This camp also tends to contrast empathy with an equally controversial and misunderstood word: inference. It states that inferences are nonempathic conclusions based upon or derived from observations of overt behavior and/or preconceived formulations. When one cannot be empathic, one then relies on inference. However, it is certainly not the case that all those who adjure empathy are as enthusiastic about the use of what is attributed to inference. Some may also ally empathy with inference Buie, (1981) and thereupon denigrate empathy even further, saying that inference is not the same as direct observation and thus is unreliable. Thus both empathy and inference are considered, together or apart; and the one or the other is surely a problem.

The other camp takes an equally severe but quite contrasting position: that empathy is a common and universal mode of communication between people. Just as direct observation allows us to understand others by drawing conclusions from overt behavior, so too does vicarious introspection allow an equal gathering up of data and the reaching of conclusions. So too do both direct observation and empathy run the risk of mistaken conclusions