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This essay is based on the concept of metapsychology in the sense in which it was introduced into psychoanalysis by Freud. It has been said that the term metapsychology should properly mean an examination of what branch of human knowledge psychoanalysis is part of, in particular whether it is a natural science or a hermeneutic discipline. But the term metapsychology as used in psychoanalysis ordinarily refers not to such an epistemological discussion but to the particular position on the issue taken by Freud, namely, that psychoanalysis is a natural science.
Metapsychology is a term which figures centrally in psychoanalytic theory but has no generally agreed-upon definition. That is one of the important reasons why the proper role of metapsychology in psychoanalytic theory is much disputed among analysts.
Freud used the term metapsychology in two significantly different senses, one use occasional and the other by far the prevalent one. The occasional use distinguishes theory from the psychology of consciousness. Metapsychology in this usage means depth psychology, defined as the psychology which takes unconscious processes into account.
Many psychoanalysts do use the term metapsychology in this way. To them, therefore, an analyst who rejects metapsychology is rejecting the unconscious, undoubtedly a shibboleth of psychoanalysis.
The concept of unconscious mental processes is so central in psychoxanalysis that Freud's first proposal for dividing up the systems of the