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In Part I of this chapter I concluded that one way to resolve some of the problems with which psychoanalysis, as a clinical theory, is confronted is to reconcile the inconsistencies between its clinical theory and its developmental theory. I further concluded that the coherence criterion should have supremacy over the correspondence criterion and that a bridge may then be built between the two theories. Since coherence theories address the issue of the meaning of human thought and conduct, a theory of human communication could serve as the foundation for a psychodynamic perspective. Such a bridge would be based on the principle that the purview of a psychoanalytic psychology is the domain of meaning as it relates to human thought and conduct. Constructing a developmental theory that articulates the manner in which meanings are acquired and communication emerges between an infant and its caregivers becomes a first step toward that goal. In the following pages I address the issues related to the construction of such a bridge.
With regard to developmental theories, it is important to reiterate that there is now widespread agreement that clinical data alone cannot yield a developmental theory; in principle, it is impossible to confirm the historical accuracy of a patient's recollections without violating the canons of good clinical practice. Yet developmental theories are critically useful adjuncts to clinical practice because of the light they can shed on the genesis of disorders of the self.
In this chapter Freud's contributions are being interpreted as extending our understanding of human experience by the exploration of their meaning. Freud proposed that meanings are not only bound to linguistic