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Controversies about the interpretation of patients’ associations, texts, and other materials are rarely amenable to experimental or empirical exploration. One may look to criteria beyond the given data in the attempt to validate interpretive strategies. For example, Freud (e.g., Freud, 1940) insisted that the interpretation of psychological events be consistent with biological “facts.” Alternatively, interpretations may be judged by the extent to which they elaborate and enrich understanding (Ricoeur, 1970, 1977, 1986). Interpretations may be judged for their pragmatic efficacy in producing therapeutic change or providing a basis for decisions (e.g., in law). Generally, interpreters adopt a congenial and/or traditional point of view whose broad outlines they rarely question.
In the course of his clinical work as a psychoanalyst one of us (R. G-L.) has repeatedly found himself attracted to two mutually contradictory interpretive positions. One position is that all human interests are transformations of bodily experiences and concerns and can be usefully interpreted as such. The other sees apparent bodily interests as expressions of attempts to organize experience on various abstract planes. In an attempt to explore and compare the value of these two interpretive strategies, clinical material was reviewed for instances that make particularly clear distinctions between them.
Expressions of disgust were often found to be amenable to both interpretations. Disgust is a deeply visceral experience, usually closely linked to specific bodily sensations and images. At the same time, it is commonly aroused by experiences that are manifestly unrelated to the