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In Part 1, a companion paper, I criticize the modern trend of conceptualizing mind/brain activity in terms of internal “representations.” In its place I suggest nonrepresentational, interdisciplinary theories of learning such as those of Rapaport (1951) and Gedo (1991). Such learning theories reexamine how knowledge is acquired, an ancient epistemological question. In Part 2, a second companion paper, I examine, together with Ernest Kent, more details of such “expert systems,” introducing an interdisciplinary perspective on the concept of psychoanalytic transference. Specifically, I suggest that transference plays an important role in the reorganization and deepening of core knowledge systems.
In Part 3, the present essay, I explore some of the philosophical issues raised by Parts 1 and 2, concentrating on a line of development of philosophy of mind in which the major nodal points are the contributions of Aristotle, Kant, and Freud. Philosophy of mind impacts on several aspects of psychoanalytic concern.1 One such area considered is how our philosophical