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As a psychoanalyst contemplating Edelman's (1992) model of the mind/brain, I have felt quite excited about the possibilities it suggests for our field. There is a cost for everything, even for good ideas, and before I go further, I want to point out some of the old and cherished beliefs and presumptions we will be prompted to reexamine, clarify, reaffirm, or perhaps relinquish as we consider Dr. Edelman's model.
There are some presuppositional differences between Edelman's mind/brain model and most psychoanalytic models, some of which I discuss here, focusing on three: the nature of evidence or data, the unified mind/brain, and the nature of change.
Most immediately striking is that Edelman's definition of evidence for ideas about the theory of the mind is that it is objective and empirically observable, like for all natural science. This is unlike the evidence in clinical psychoanalysis, which is empathic observation of subjective states that does not meet the criteria of reliability and validity.
A second tenet of Edelman's mind/brain model is that mind and brain are unified as one, with the psychological mind being rooted in the biological brain processes. Many psychoanalysts would not agree, and instead they would assume that biology and psychology are separate but somehow reflect one another. This has supported a belief for many psychoanalysts that biology can be safely ignored, except in life-threatening circumstances or for very sick patients where psychopharmacology can be helpful. Among
another smaller number of psychoanalysts, a reductionist position has been held, when the biological brain processes are considered shadows of the mind's organization.
In Edelman's mind/brain model, developmental change in the life span and the reorganizational change that results from therapeutic intervention are not the same process. Most psychoanalysts do not make this distinction, and in fact would argue that successful therapeutic intervention reengages development. From