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Referring to psychoanalysis proprietarily as "our science" represents at least two widely divergent attitudes about the scientific status of psychoanalysis: (1) a sober view that nothing tests the validity of psychoanalytic theory as convincingly as the psychoanalytic method itself, and (2) a regrettably rigid dogmatism about the validity of psychoanalytic theory that resembles religious fervor in that it is born of faith rather than observation.
Beginning with a discussion of the appropriateness of discussing psychoanalysis as a science and the inappropriateness of citing therapeutic results as evidence of its scientific status, it is still necessary to distinguish between the techniques and theories of psychoanalysis. There is a vital distinction between those aspects of psychoanalytic theory which are established fact, those which are hypotheses, and those which are classificatory schemata. It is important to establish hierarchies of theory according to validity, testability of hypotheses, and distance from the data of observation. Difficulties inherent in devising noncircular means of testing psychoanalytic propositions lead to exploration of efforts to minimize observer bias by employing multiple observers, utilizing external means of validating psychoanalytic reconstructions, the role of predictions in psychoanalysis, and the vital issue of the storage and retrieval of psychoanalytic data.