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Affect is not "a thing" which can be qualitatively or quantitatively measured, but rather an abstract concept referring to theoretical psychic states, one aspect of which—feelings—are subjectively experienced. Such psychic states or structures, of greater or lesser stability, have instinctual referrents, a hierarchal structure, cognitive representations, subjectively perceived "feelings," objectively observable physiologic and somatic concomitants, some degree of stability and permanence, and of instinctualization. Such structures (feeling states) may be used, with emphasis on one or another
aspect of that structure, by the ego for signal, conflictual, defensive, synthetic, structural, regulatory, object evaluational, or adaptive purposes. Such feeling states regulate and structure subsequent experience and are themselves structured by that experience. Unconscious structuralized relationships have the potential to evoke "feelings." Even the highest form of symbolic representation is meaningful only through its direct and indirect links with feelings. In this sense there is no such thing as a purely cognitive or intellectual process. Although affects are frequently referred to as "signals" or as if they were themselves motivational, this is true only in terms of their relational context with instinctual, cognitive, and genetic components.