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The "action language" for psychoanalysis which Schafer proposes is a welcome comment on Freud's mode of conceptualization while attempting to dispense with his mechanistic vocabulary. Even more welcome is Schafer's implicit invitation to philosophers to join the conversation, since we have been talking a long time ourselves about several issues which his work transects. Recalling these, therefore, may help to frame both the strengths and the weaknesses of his account.
One of these issues is the nature of reason itself: it's intrinsically interesting, but philosophers have also valued it as a means of illuminating human behavior. Trees don't do things for reasons and on purpose and in light of certain beliefs; human beings do.
This investigation therefore raises a more general question about the place of man and mind in the world order. Human beings do not much resemble lower animals, but there is a kinship to felines and to other primates. Since people have always used their presumed differences—both from other species and from other human groups—as justification for oppression and celebrations of all kinds, the definition of these differences has profound moral consequences. What is it so peculiar to ourselves that justifies the belief, in this culture, that killing a cow isn't murder, while killing another human being may be; and taking a bone from a dog isn't stealing, while taking someone else's wife or husband may be? More important, whatever this peculiarity is, can we assume that all human beings have it, and to the same degree?
The obverse of this question inquires about the meaning of "responsibility." In one tone of voice, we sometimes say that mad dogs are as responsible as Englishmen for whatever damage they