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IN A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, Vann Spruiell set the stage for the discussion and raised questions about the subject of the day. He also reminded the audience that a companion panel with a clinical emphasis was scheduled.
Spruiell stated that, in one sense, character represents the regularities in one person's behavior as observed by another, a pattern of related activities. It thus represents the singularity or uniqueness of a person, and hence his predictability. In another sense character represents a type of person, hence the placement of an individual in a group of supposedly like individuals. In both senses, character arises in the mind of the observer.
What of the theory that accounts for these regularities in the mental activities of individuals? We have a general theory in which we can order all psychological observations, including those made outside our field, and we have limited theories which may explain the origins of many specific character traits (but perhaps not all). Here the differences of opinion begin. Are character traits constituted or expressed differently in behavior than are symptoms? Must we postulate something special, in the intrapsychic sense, when we speak of "character," as we postulate something specific when we speak of ego? Do we look especially for the part played by constitutional and economic features that contribute to the uniqueness of ego, id, and