Response to Rangell

I wish first to express my appreciation to Leo Rangell for his thoughtful and supportive commentary. He has provided an overarching and encompassing framework for the argument regarding the functions of the will in psychoanalysis that gives the discussion greater breadth and perspective, particularly in reference to its historical and theoretical context. While we seem to have reached a general consensus regarding the nature and functions of the will, there are also points of divergence that deserve comment, if only for the sake of clarification in the light of further possible dialogue among analysts concerned with these issues.

Beyond the broad scope of our agreement, there are issues of meta-psychological perspective on which we differ and that should not be ignored. I read him, correctly or not, as writing from the perspective of traditional drive-defense and structural theory, with particular reference to the ego psychology of the Hartmann-Rapaport tradition. My approach, however, would seem to be hovering at least in spirit closer to the perspectives of Erikson, Brenner, and Schafer. Limitations of space do not leave room for detailed explanation here; I have presented more detailed discussions in publications cited in my paper.

Rangell zeroes in on a central point of divergence when he addresses the issue of agency. He comes directly to the point in questioning my expression “executive functions of the ego-self.” The term ego-self may have been ill-chosen, but it was selected purposefully to reflect a terminological compromise. While some operations of the will can be described as executive functions, the issue of agency warrants further specification. In other words, what agency does the deliberating, deciding, choosing, and initiating? For Rangell, it is the ego: “The executive agent is the ego.” For me, the executive agent is the self. What is the significant difference in our perspectives? In the operative metapsychology supporting my argument, there is no