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For Jonathan Lear, trained in two dialogical fields, philosophy and psychoanalysis, The Case for Irony is another expression of his long-standing commitment to understanding the relationship between the two. Exploring that relationship goes back to the early years of psychoanalysis—the minutes of the Vienna Society record several philosophers participating in those meetings—and Lear has a number of predecessors and colleagues in this enterprise.1 His own labors span now some twenty years of publications. Among the themes running through much of his work are two that are most salient in this book: one is the question of transformation: How do philosophy and psychoanalysis each aspire to bring about profound change in mind and heart, including transformations in the social and political sphere? The second is how psychoanalysis and contemporary moral philosophy interdigitate and, especially in this book, how moral philosophy needs psychoanalysis for a richer and more realistic view of how the person as moral agent is constituted. His books, essays, and collections of essays, while always interdisciplinary in their larger purpose, have varied in the degree to which they are addressed primarily to psychoanalysts, philosophers, or more general audiences (e.g., earlier essays in The New Republic). The present book is heavily tilted toward a readership of philosophers, dealing in great depth, it seems to me, with issues of current concern in contemporary philosophy dealing with morals and ethics. Clearly, for Lear explicating the relevance of philosophy and philosophical exploration for psychoanalysts is also