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Metapsychology isn't every psychoanalyst's cup of tea. A few can take it, some with a little lemon; others add milk or sugar; many leave it untouched, push it aside, or refuse to accept it at all. And there are those who cannot stand it but cannot leave it alone, take a distasteful sip, and complain about it loudly to their companions. Table manners are not always impeccable.
Analogy is easily pushed too far; but up to this point, I believe, it reflects, however crudely, the current state of affairs. Some recent books underline the point, perhaps because earlier criticisms of metapsychology are considered by some to be given added weight by more recent developments in neighbouring fields. Observational research in child development (especially infancy), the neurosciences, and so-called cognitive science are among the disciplines whose findings are nowadays often invoked to pronounce the demise of metapsychology.
It is rightly said that workers in disciplines that share common interests should keep in touch with each other's findings and even cooperate in matters of mutual concern. This is more easily said than done. But the practising psychiatrist, for example, needs some basic knowledge of biology, genetics, neurology, sociology, epidemiology, and for that matter statistics, to name examples, though his knowledge in any one of these fields will rarely reach specialist proportions. And he must, above all, have a comprehensive general psychology that takes into account both normal and abnormal development. Psychoanalysis is the only psychology that meets these requirements, though this does not mean that the findings of academic investigators cannot be of real value.1
These various disciplines need not be at odds with each other, and