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The second in a series of public Study Days, this time on the topic of Divorce, Children, Courts and the Law, was held on February 26, 1994. As with the first Study Day, on Bullying, we had representatives of a wide cross-section of disciplines in the audience, and the day was structured so as to promote discussion across professional boundaries under the chairmanship of Rose Edgcumbe.
We were very fortunate that Dame Margaret Booth, until her retirement a distinguished judge in the Family Division, agreed to give a presentation. Dame Margaret's paper outlines some of the far-reaching changes in the child's position in family proceedings that are the result of the 1989 Children Act, and deals with some of the problems that have arisen as a consequence of the legislation.
By Dame Margaret Booth
The Children Act 1989 has made some radical changes in relation to the child's position in family proceedings. This morning I propose to discuss some of them and ask the question ‘Do we now expect too much of the child in the court process?’ We will encounter some other problems on the way.
Since not everyone may be familiar with the details of the Act, I will first try to put the position of the child in context as shortly as I can, starting with the general principles. The 1989 Act re-enacts the cardinal rule that whenever the court has to determine a question with respect to the upbringing of a child, whether in the public or in the private law sector, that child's welfare shall be its paramount consideration. The statute also ensures that in all such proceedings the court must have regard to the child's ascertainable wishes and feelings and consider them in the light of his age and understanding. So the voice of the child must always be heard. But there are also circumstances when