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There are many points in Freud's development which have been hailed as watersheds. Among these have been the formulation of the seduction theory in 1896, the beginning of Freud's self-analysis in 1897, the completion of The Interpretation of Dreams in 1899 and the formulation of the second topography in 1923. In the present paper I will argue that Freud effected a hitherto unrecognised but nonetheless momentous shift during the year 1895. I believe that the ‘turn’ of 1895 was more crucial for the development of psychoanalysis than any of the other nodal points listed above, for the creation of a psychoanalytic theory of the mind would not have been possible in its absence. Strange as it may sound, Freud's transition of 1895 was philosophical in nature: it was a shift from one view of the relation between brain and mind to another. More specifically, at some point during 1895 Freud moved from Cartesian dualism to a materialistic indentity theory of psyche/soma.
What is the relevance of this thesis to the Studies on Hysteria? As the Studies was written whilst Freud was in the midst of transition it is itself a transitional work. Studies on Hysteria stands with one foot in the pre-psychoanalytic past and the other in the psychoanalytic future. An understanding of Freud's philosophical dilemma both enriches our appreciation of the Studies and illuminates its limitations.
The relationship between body and soul - or, in more modern terminology, mind and brain - has been a subject of philosophical concern since time immemorial. One theory, which was articulated most compellingly by Descartes, is called ‘substance dualism’ (or ‘Cartesian dualism’). Substance dualism is based on the intuition that the mental and the physical are very different kinds of things. For example, physical items take up space whilst (according to Descartes) mental items do not. Descartes therefore asserted that matter (including body and brain) and mind are two distinct substances. As