Of Sentiments and Sensations

In psychoanalytic thinking the affect theory presents special difficulties. The affect has been described as the qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual energy and of its fluctuations.

Rapaport pointed out that we do not possess a systematic statement of the theory of affect and that many of the concepts encountered by the student of psychoanalytic theory are often imprecise and sometimes contradictory. According to Rapaport (1953), the theory of affects integrates three components: inborn affect, dischargechannels and discharge-threshold of drive cathexis; the use of these inborn channels as safety valves and indicators of drive tension, the modification of their threshholds by drives and derivative motivations, prevented from drive-action and the formation thereby of the drive-representation turned affect-chart; and the progressive ‘taming’ and advancing ego control, in the course of psychic structure-formation, of the affects which are thereby turned into affect-signals released by the ego.

One common but potent source of confusion is that of identifying the theory of anxiety with the theory of affects in general. The latter includes the former but is not identical to it. The special nature of anxiety and its differences from other affects is something I will mention only, as expanding on it is beyond the scope of this essay. I would like to mention here Anna Freud's (1936) The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence since it distinguishes between those defences which are directed against anxiety and those which are employed against other affective states. The distinction between the role of anxiety and measures to avoid other kinds of psychic pain is crucial.

The way in which different groups of people deal with their feelings is what concerns us today and for my presentation I have selected individuals who, among the many different ways of attempting to deal with painful feelings, often replace them with the sensations provoked by virtue of pharmacological