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Philosophers of science have frequently charged that psychoanalysis lacks any kind of scientific grounding. It is our contention that such a charge rests, in part, on the problematic assumption that all sciences should conform to the model of theoretical physics Freud himself invited this unfortunate comparison when he stated that by inferring the existence of unconscious processes we are “put … in a position to establish psychology on foundations similar to those of any other science, such, for instance, as physics” (1940, p. 196)
It is our contention that it is inappropriate to try to compare psychoanalysis to theoretical physics. In fact, we claim that it is more appropriate to compare psychoanalysis to the model of medical science. Psychoanalysis was developed by physicians as a method to treat psychological problems that were seen as an analogue of physical illness. Physicians would naturally be appealing to the standards of their own science rather than to those of theoretical physics.1
The prevailing belief, apparently shared by Freud, was that the model of theoretical physics is the same as that of medical science, the only difference lying in the area of quantification. That is, medical science cannot make the same types of precise predictions and measurements that are possible in physics. We are not sure that this assumption is true, however, and believe that possibly these two models are distinct in important respects Theoretical physics is a discipline that remains true to the ideals of the philosophers who founded it. Physics seeks knowledge as an end in itself and is unconcerned about possible applications of that knowledge. Medicine, on the other hand, seeks