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We have recently offered a few comments on Wilma Bucci's paper in this journal on the transformations of meaning in the analytic discourse (Bucci 1998). In a nutshell, we have suggested that the process she describes as referential activity is a component of a more general activity of psychic transformation that we term mentalization (Bouchard & Lecours 1998, Lecours & Bouchard 1997). We have briefly described our model of levels of increasing mentalization, consisting of two basic intertwined dimensions: four modes of representation and five levels of tolerance/abstraction. We have submitted that referential activity might concentrate on only one dimension of mentalization (modes of representation).
Bucci (1999), in her response to our comments, warns us about the risks of including outdated metapsychological principles into a more contemporary analytic understanding of psychic processes. She alludes to what she considers as our implicit use of economic concepts (psychic energy) and rejects the idea that sensory and somatic experiences have to be transformed to become part of psychic life. She states that “subsymbolic and symbolic nonverbal systems are organized processing modalities, with their own organizing principles, operating in endogenous and modality specific formats from the beginning of life” (24).
We fully agree with her epistemological cautiousness and wisdom: we also think that a careful examination of theoretical a priori is prerequisite to any rigorous theory making and an essential task needing to be constantly renewed, similar to a kind of “conceptual self-analysis.” In addition, we also welcome critical dialogue, which, as Bucci comments, is badly missing from the discussion of psychoanalytic hypotheses and empirical tests. We are happy to have this occasion to