Reply to Drs. Schechter and Wolstein

Dr. Schechter discusses two conceptions of Sullivan's; namely, "interpersonal relations" and "parataxic." In doing so, he has developed and amplified what I wrote. By his detailed explications, he clarifies the meaning and significance of these two concepts. While Schechter deliberately omitted from his discussion reference to the relevance of these concepts to a science of man, his very lucidity facilitates understanding of their relevance. How? Schechter notes that the concept of interpersonal relations refers both to structure and process, and both to the intrapsychic and to behavioral interactions between individuals. With a term that refers to both at once, Sullivan avoids the artificial disassociation of these inextricably interpenetrating phenomena, making possible a novel approach to the science of man. This overcomes the difficulties of the overstructuralization of the Freudian superego-ego-id theory. It offers a superior, more flexible approach to the science of man, which includes both process and structure, both situation and person.

Dr. Wolstein, on the other hand, maintains that Sullivan's approach is untenable because his is a theory of interpersonal relations without individuality. How can such a theory possibly have value, he asks repetitiously and rhetorically. He gives no evidence that a theory including the concept of unique individuality is the gainer by its inclusion. He makes it sound like some crucial and fatal omission to have a theory of interpersonal relations without a concept of a "real self." Wolstein mistakenly equates unique individuality or self with the concept of a separate person. I agree it is unthinkable to have a theory of interpersonal relations without some concept of a separate or individual person. But what is a person? I do not believe that one needs to postulate that person and unique individuality or "real self" are synonymous. In fact, it makes much more sense, as Sullivan adumbrates, together with Ouspen