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A MAJOR CONCERN IN THE practice of psychotherapy is the patient's responsibility for himself. To what extent is he accountable to himself for what he is and does? Answers to this question revolve around the issue of choice, or freedom. There is no sense in referring to accountability without examining the status of the options available. Such an examination usually falls under the rubric of the free will—determinism controversy.
The contemporary form of this controversy arises, on the deterministic side, out of the application of natural science—specifically scientific materialism—to the understanding of human behavior. The free will side has its roots in the universally felt experience of freedom of choice.
The subjective experience of freedom is not unitary but can be described in a number of different but related dimensions. Freedom "from, " contrasted with freedom "to, " is one such dimension. Restrictions, constraints, and obligations, imposed rather than chosen, exist as an obstacle to the experience of freedom. Similarly, responsibilities and emotional attachments, chosen but then regretted, result in the same thing. Relief from these felt burdens is then experienced as freedom. A whole subcultural group some years ago, the Beatniks, prized freedom from personal attachments as a desired prerequisite for the good life. In contrast, freedom "to" focuses on one's availability to commit oneself. Active participation in the events of living, involvement in meaningful relationships, forming one's values are all accompanied by the experience of freedom. In fact, without this kind of participatory commitment, the simple freedom from constraint leads to the experience of emptiness.