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To the Editors:
Over the past twenty years, Jacques Lacan has developed a special approach to psychoanalysis which has come to be known as Lacanian theory. Lacan considers himself only a psychoanalyst. Nevertheless, I believe his contributions to psychiatry, to philosophy generally, and particularly to the philosophy of science, are highly significant. His epistemology is particularly well-known.
Three important considerations emerge from his work. First, the basic limits of psychoanalysis. We know that every science is limited by an established frame of reference. The moment changes occur altering the limits of the basic frame of reference of a particular science, we enter new unknown areas. Since these areas fall outside the basic limits, a different scientific field is entered. For example, while the findings of physics are constantly changing, as long as the basic object retains its original character, we still find ourselves within the boundaries of physics. However, the moment the basic object changes its character, we find ourselves in a new field, in this instance, chemistry.
With regard to psychoanalysis, Lacan states that what the patient says about X is important since it falls within the basic limits or frame of reference of psychoanalysis. This implies that whatever falls outside the limits of what the patient says about X is not important to the psychoanalyst. Lacan then asks, to what does this X—talked about by the patient—refer? A psychoanalyst has no implements with which to examine this X about which the patient talks. All that is available to the psychoanalyst is that which is related by the patient. The analyst can only draw analogies from what he is told, the resulting calculus (algebra of logic) being the