The Value of Uncertainty in Psychoanalytic Practice

THERE IS A LINE OF THOUGHT in Dr. Witenberg's paper with which I am in full agreement. This line of thought is one which is opposed to dogmatism and absolutism. It is against the notion that any current theory has a hold on the truth, about either human development and motivation or about correct analytic technique, and also that any theory could, in principle, ever achieve such a degree of certainty. On the contrary, the point of view that Dr. Witenberg espouses is that what we understand, especially in the realm of interpersonal and subjective experience, is always provisional and always relative to certain perspectives that are operating at a given time in the process of exploration. Our understanding is constructed in accord with our world views and theoretical preconceptions as well as our personal, selective sensitivities within the analytic situation.

In addition, Dr. Witenberg points to what I think is an optimal position with respect to theory and its application to any specific clinical situation. He says, for example, "I submit that none of the theories singly or combined is going to solve the dissatisfaction [that is, the dissatisfaction with theory in general]. I find each of them [that is, each theory] useful for certain issues in practice as a way of my having multiple transitional objects. They give me a certain security when I listen to a patient. But I spend an awful lot of time trying to get these theories out of my head so that I can listen to the patient, so that I can generate questions that are more relevant than the existing theories are to this particular person with this particular analyst."

This use of theory strikes me as optimal. The paradox that Dr. Witenberg points to in this and other statements, in which he makes use of and tries to get rid of theoretical preconceptions, is a necessary one. He takes in to account the fact that, at any given moment, any particular patient-analyst interaction has features