Transference and Parataxic Distortion2

ANY PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSTRUCT INHERENTLY rests on the underlying metapsychological premises of the theory of which it is a part. Such is the case with both the concepts of transference and parataxic distortion. Therefore, although I will not elaborate here on this particular principle because it is not essential to the purposes of this communication, it is worth noting that elsewhere1 I articulated the view that the underlying premise of the interpersonal position involves what I called a "drive reflected in a need for tenderness." I noted the definition of "drive" which I was using and contrasted the nature of the phenomenon I was positing with the position of various theorists, both interpersonal and from other schools of thought. I took the position that employing the term "drive" was useful for the sake of linguistic simplicity, acceptable because Sullivan himself used the term in what I think was a similar manner, and cautioned that I was using the term to indicate a motivational and organizing force. I argued that in this context, Freud's concept was a derivative of his nineteenth century neurobiological background and bias. Sullivan's position was a natural extension of his principle of communal existence, which was most clearly articulated in "The Illusion of Personal Individuality" (1964). I concluded that for Freud the essence of existence was quiescence of the internal state, while for Sullivan it was the excitement of the internal state. This, I suggested, was the extended