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THE PHYSICS NOBELIST RICHARD FEYNMAN tells a delightfully charming anecdote in his collection of reminiscences which shows us how science functions (1988). It's about Feynman's father pointing out that calling a bird a "Spencer's warbler" in English, a chutto lapittida in Italian, a chung-long-tah in Chinese, or a katano takedo in Japanese (even if these foreignisms are accurate, which probably they are not), adds nothing to our scientific knowledge about the bird. All we know is what humans in different places call it. If you want to know something about the bird you have to look at it to see what it's doing (Feynman, 1988, pp. 13–14). What follows from Feynman's father's wisdom is that naming, which is supposed to lead to knowledge, should rightfully establish a relationship between us and that which is named. If it doesn't, which is most often, it cannot lead to knowledge. In psychotherapy it may lead to misunderstanding. An attribution based on the self-indulgent