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Philip Cushman sounds a cautionary note for those who subscribe to the relational analytic paradigm, or to any other paradigm influenced by what he calls the “interpretive turn.” He wants us to take heed of the flaws in our philosophical mentors' lives and philosophies, and he spells out those flaws with care and balance. He also offers a way out of them: to redress Heidegger's arrogant monologism and monoculturalism, he prescribes Gadamer's correction to and extension of Heidegger's theory of authenticity, particularly Gadamer's emphasis on dialogue. Dialogue, he argues, counters Heidegger's disrespect for the interpersonal and social realm. To address Foucault's flaw—a missing moral perspective that might offer a counter to the abuses of power—he prescribes both Gramsci's theory of hegemony and Gadamer's theory of dialogue. Cushman argues that while Foucault's practice of genealogy opens us up to the recognition of difference, only dialogue enables us to do anything constructive with that recognition and to avoid nihilism.
I imagine that the occasion of Cushman's scrutiny of these theorists is that he sees something of those flaws operating within our own analytic theories and practices. Nonetheless, Cushman concludes that the therapeutic encounter is a privileged site of dialogue and, sadly, one of the few places left in our world where there is the good will for dialogue and the capacity to take on another point of view.
It is with regard to this sad state of affairs that I formulate my response, hoping not so much to critique what Cushman has to say, but rather to draw out some of the implications of his essay for clinical practice. Specifically, I want to think here about what a nonconformist psychoanalytic practice might look like. To do so, however, requires an examination in some detail of difficult philosophical and social theory that may