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Recently, psychoanalytic writers have tried to take account of social constructivist thinking in their work on gender and sexual orientation. Some, who have accepted part of the thrust of social constructivism, nevertheless maintain that “radical” constructivism goes too far, or is utopian (e.g., Aron, 1995; Corbett, 1995). In some ways Mitchell's paper reflects a similar point of view. His appreciation for constructivism is undisguised, especially in the clinical material and clinical commentary he provides. Yet he takes pains to emphasize what he sees as the limitations of social constructivism, making cautionary distinctions between a fully constructivist analysis, and what he considers to be a best psychoanalytic position.
I find two related problems with his approach. The first is that Mitchell's presentation misconstrues social constructivism in important ways. The second is that, based on his reading of constructivism, Mitchell regards the best psychoanalytic approach to gender and sexual orientation to include essentialist understandings as well as deconstructive analysis. With respect to this position I argue that he may be undervaluing the clinical import of social constructivism, while at the same time, granting essentialism excessive credibility.
By juxtaposing essentialism and constructivism, and implying an equivalency between these two perspectives, Mitchell stakes out a