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This article explores psychoanalytic theory within contemporary debates on free will, its philosophical and scientific dimensions. Freud's alignment of mental life with the Naturwissenschaften places psychic processes within a deterministic framework, where free will appears illusory. Yet, Freud offers a naturalized account, anticipating neuroethical issues and epistemological challenges concerning agency within a scientific worldview. Freud develops a compatibilist theory, scientifically grounded and therapeutically effective. His metapsychological reflections support a model in which free will is not negated but enabled through psychoanalytic work. This framework suggests the experience of freedom arises not from abstract empowerments but from the integration of repressed contents—fulfilling the Freudian imperative: «Where id was, there ego shall be». Key implications include: (1) reconciling cognitive science's models with naturalistic agency; (2) the clinical relevance of freedom as a capacity hindered by neuroses (e.g., compulsions); (3) psychoanalysis's therapeutic function restoring volition through insight, not instruction. Ultimately, neuroses are interpreted as pathologies of freedom. Following Freud, the will is not innately free, but can become so through a difficult process of self-knowledge. Thus, the subject is both determined and, paradoxically, potentially free. The article argues for Freud's relevance in building a non-reductionist, scientifically credible theory of free will, attuned to contemporary science and human dignity.