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What does thinking require? This paper draws on object relations theory—particularly Bion's account of alpha-function and containment, and Winnicott's concepts of potential space and holding—to argue that thinking, understood as the capacity to transform raw experience into thinkable form, depends on environmental conditions that can be supported or degraded. I examine whether contemporary technological environments, particularly those shaped by artificial intelligence, algorithmic curation, and the attention economy, threaten these conditions. The paper identifies four interconnected dynamics: the outsourcing of transformative cognitive work to AI systems; the colonization of potential space by algorithmically optimized stimuli; the substitution of pseudo-containment (systems that receive communications but cannot metabolize them) for genuine human containment; and structural support for orientations against knowing. I review empirical literature from cognitive science, clinical psychiatry, and AI research that provides evidence consistent with these theoretical concerns. The paper argues that what is at stake is not primarily privacy, manipulation, or autonomy in their usual senses, but the ongoing capacity for generative thinking itself—a concern that dominant frameworks in AI ethics are not well-positioned to articulate.