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It is not very long ago since a distinguished academic psychologist remarked to the present writer that his life (qua psychologist) had scarcely been worth living since he had taken up the study of psycho-analysis. This candid avowal on the part of a scholar of exceptionally open mind and widespread interests expresses a worried mental condition from which he is not the only one to suffer, but which is in all probability shared by many of his broader-minded colleagues. Psycho-analysis is far too strong and living a movement in psychology to be neglected with impunity (even by those who might otherwise be tempted to adopt this ostrich-like method of seeking temporary peace of mind); on the other hand its relations to the general body of academic and experimental psychology are still in many respects far from clear, and the paths by which we may hope eventually to pass easily from one body of doctrine to the other are at present among the most dark and dangerous places that have to be trodden by those whose task it is to expound psychology as a whole. Prof. Pear in this book attemps the hazardous but important task of following up these paths a little farther in one or two directions than has yet been done; and he attempts it with such a charming combination of confidence, clear-headedness, grace and modesty that all will wish him well and all will be interested in following his course, whatever may be their ultimate opinion as to the outcome of his efforts.
The two chief novelties that Prof. Pear has here introduced into the treatment of memory are, first, the recognition that forgetting presents problems that are at least as interesting and important as those of remembering, and, secondly, the inclusion of a study of dreams. In both cases it is the influence of psycho-analysis that has brought about the change. 'To-day', says Prof. Pear, confidently enough, with regard to his second innovation, 'nobody who includes