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In dealing with the theoretical conceptions of the moral imbecile, Burt discusses earlier psychological hypotheses and shows that the idea of a specific moral faculty sprang from the intuitionists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moral sense was depicted as a kind of inherited conscience. Morality can rest upon no simple innate intuition, but must be learnt afresh by each individual. The modern view is that 'conscience' is the name given to a complicated aggregate of certain apperceptive systems. Moral character rests on certain inborn dispositions, but never was itself inborn. Discussing various views regarding alleged innate deficiency of moral inhibition, Burt points out that inhibition is now regarded not as a positive function of some particular centre, but as a secondary and negative effect of any and all nervous activity. Commenting on the bearing which the herd instinct has on moral sense, it is shown that here we find a considerable risk of over-simplification. Rees Thomas has recognized this danger and points out that the moral outcome of the herd instinct will largely depend upon the morality of the herd among which the individual happens to be cast. The moral imbecile cannot simply be