Come Funziona La Nostra Intelligenza: By Eugenio Rignano. (Nicola Zanichelli, Bologna, 1922. Pp. 46.)

This little book represents a communication made to the Congress of Philosophy at Paris in December, 1921, and contains a clear and attractive though perhaps over-simplified account of the essential nature of the process of reasoning—a matter which the author has treated at greater length in his 'Psychology of Reasoning.' Professor Rignano's views are in certain respects not unlike those of Freud, though apparently developed quite independently of psycho-analytical doctrines. Thus the present book starts with considerations concerning conflict between psychic tendencies—considerations which bear a certain resemblance to Freud's formulations concerning the Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle—while some of the views in the larger book are similar to those advanced by Freud concerning 'death instincts.' In psycho-analytical terminology we may say that Rignano regards the reasoning processes as being intimately connected with the origin of the Reality Principle as a check upon the unrestricted play of the Pleasure Principle. He goes on to deal in an illuminating way with the advantages and disadvantages of reasoning as compared with perceptual experience. He does not, however, consider the relations between Reasoning and Imagination, and thus fails to come into touch with the important rôle of hallucinatory and imaginal satisfaction in the service of the Pleasure Principle.