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It is to be remarked of most volumes of collected papers and addresses that, however wide the range of the author's interest, in the long run some few tendencies or personal attitudes stand in relief if only by reason of their constant repetition in various guises. Indeed the fascination induced by 'drawing the coverts' for these individual stigmata is a legitimate recompense for the reviewer's labour. As against this satisfaction must be placed the legitimate state of exasperation induced by the discovery that a book with the definite, if somewhat comprehensive, title of Science and Personality, confesses itself in the Preface to be about the nature of religion in relation to science and philosophy, and ultimately proves to be a collection of papers on a variety of psychological topics, some of them of an extremely controversial nature. One is irresistibly reminded of the condition of a housewife's satchel on market day, when the more protuberant bulges of an irregular mass indicate the catholicity of her requirements. This is a thousand pities. There are very few in this country so qualified as Dr. Brown to write with authority on the relations of Religion and Philosophy to Psychology and (or) Science. But the upshot of this effort is that it is a disappointing book on the psychology of religion, a goodish book on the philosophical aspects of academic psychology, and a bad book on the controversial side of analytical psychology.
For the convenience of readers it may be said that the theory and practice of psycho-analysis is repeatedly referred to throughout the book, and that some chapters are practically exclusively concerned with exposition and criticism of psycho-analytic theory and practice; but it must be said at once that although Dr. Brown is well qualified to write on many aspects of psychology, he is evidently poorly qualified to write on psycho-analysis. This