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What constitutes a 'normal' mind, and whether such a thing can actually exist, are questions of considerable theoretical, and sometimes of practical, interest. Even if we conclude that in an absolute sense no mind can be entirely and completely normal it is nevertheless worth asking what would be the attributes of such a mind. For, with such a standard before us, it would be easier to determine how far a given mind under treatment had progressed in the direction of normality.
Therapeutists are principally concerned with such gross deviations from normality as cause no difficulty in deciding whether or not they are deviations; and that is probably the reason why the present question has not found much consideration in psycho-analytical literature. If a person can never leave the shelter of his home lest a thunderstorm come on and he be struck by lightning, or lest he be run over by a motor car, his attitude may exhibit a certain inexorable logic, but a logic so unyielding to other considerations would if 'logically' extended make life impossible, and few criteria of normality could be chosen that would not label such behaviour as 'abnormal'.
In work of this order one feels little need to ponder on careful definitions of normality, and, if asked to produce one, it is easy to be content with such general phrases as 'a mind functioning efficiently', 'a healthy mind', 'an organism well adapted to reality', 'a personality achieving its maximum of happiness', 'a personality in good contact with the social standards prevailing in the environment'. All these phrases are useful at times and serve to recall to our mind certain standards of value; they prove quite adequate in practice for gross work in psychopathology. Reflection soon shows, however, that they one and all beg the question by assuming that something, e.g. efficiency or health, has been previously defined when in fact it has not.
The case is different when we have to do with variations of conduct that depend on