'Internal Objects' and Theory1

During the last few years 'internal objects' have become increasingly controversial issues. Opinions about them range from over-valuation to undervaluation, even to repudiation as 'not analysis'. This in itself is ample evidence that we are not yet able to see Melanie Klein's contributions on this subject in true or stable perspective. One of the major tasks before the Society is the clarification and scientific assessment of these views.

The first necessity is to arrive at clear statements, in strictly definable terms, of the views that are actually current: misunderstanding is still rife. Moreover, the explanations must be made in terms that permit of their comparison with other views on corresponding matters, e.g. clinical evidence with clinical evidence, theoretical or practical implications with similar or dissimilar theoretical or practical implications. When we are clear what the views are and where and how they differ from other views, then, and only then, can we attempt to assess their scientific status. Assessment will mean consideration from at least three angles. The evidence must be examined for validity and adequacy, and for quality and quantity; the relationship of new views to old must be established; and their actual and potential implications considered. These implications fall into two groups: resultant modification in existing theory, and resultant modification in practice.

Clarity in this field is more easily sought than found. In an earlier note, the writer (1939) pointed out some probable sources of intrinsic difficulty in thinking about 'internal objects'. One of these will bear repetition, namely, that this is a realm in which native or character bias is peculiarly prone to distort the thinker's would-be objectivity. It is, therefore, greatly to be desired that as many Members as possible should report their clinical findings. A wide casting of the net and a big haul of evidence would call for ruthless sorting of the catch, but c