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The author of this book has a bee in his bonnet. It is in itself a very good bee, but for some personal reason its buzzing seems to have driven him distracted. He rightly points out that to postulate a distinct entity called the 'mind' or 'soul' is in no way necessary, and that in any event it does not afford an explanation of the phenomena called 'mental processes': further that we possess no authentic evidence of the occurrence of such phenomena except in association with bodily processes. I imagine that most psychologists would assent to these statements, as the present reviewer certainly does. At this point, however, the author takes a wide jump. The idea of a mind is to him as much a red rag as that of matter was to Berkeley, and he leaps to the conclusion that anyone whosoever studying mental processes must be possessed of what he terms the greatest and least excusable superstition of all time, namely, the delusion that the entity 'mind' has an independent existence. Carried away by this curious misapprehension he fulminates with the most extravagant abuse against every variety of psychologist, and, of course, particularly against 'the crowning absurdity of psycho-analysis'.
The author's own thesis could be stated in a few sentences; the rest of the book is nothing but unintelligent abuse. One is surprised at its being issued by a reputable publisher.