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This book is one of a series of studies in Philosophical Psychology. It is sub-titled 'A Philosophical Examination of Gestalt Theory and Derivative Theories of Perception', and hinges on the contention that, whereas psychologists, neurologists, physiologists and other scientific investigators are in a position to discover facts about perception, they are in serious difficulties if they attempt to construct a scientific theory of perception, because a statement of the type 'Perception is … X' is a conceptual and not an empirical statement. For this reason the formulation of a theory of perception is regarded as a task for philosophers. Various aspects of the philosophical investigation this implies are then tackled: the kinds of question, for example, that can be asked about visual perception are examined, together with a brief discussion of the varying approaches of Gestaltists, and derivative schools described as functionalist, transactionalist, sensationalist, to these problems.
This work would be of value to those interested in the philosophy of the sciences, but it does not deal with the types of philosophical enquiry that