On Identification

SIR,

In the paper 'On Identification', Grinker (1) makes the following statement:

Engel and Reichsman ("Incorporation, Introjection and Identification.' Engel, G. L. and Reichsman, F. Unpublished material) have made a major contribution to the problem of identification in their psychosomatic studies of Monica, an infant with an oesophageal atresia and a gastrostomy. During the earliest months of life, when objects were not differentiated from self and mental representations were not yet formed, the infant was only an incorporative being. At this time acid secretion in the stomach occurred mainly in relationship to the feeding-wakeful state. Later, object- and self-representations became differentiated, and Monica's stomach secreted acid either in response to food or when in the proximity of human beings with whom she had a pleasurable transaction. She seemed to introject these objects psychologically, using an alimentary model, as she developed mental representations of them. After self- and object-representations were clearly discriminated, qualities of the real object of their representations were acquired by Monica without alteration of gastric secretion. This, Engel and Reichsman call identification. Under conditions of stress, such as in the transference situations during psycho-analysis, when the boundaries of the self become regressively blurred, it is suggested that the processes of incorporation and introjection may be revived and earlier identifications reactivated.

We appreciate this generous evaluation of our work, but wish to call attention to the fact that it implies a greater degree of validation of these concepts than we have claimed (2), (3). Because the material referred to is unpublished, we feel it necessary to clarify our position.

The unpublished comment referred to by Grinker was a memorandum prepared by one of us (G.E.) in January 1955 to clarify for our research group our understanding of incorporation, introjection, and identification